Abstract: The idea of family altruism is that parents care only about their children's income and not about the use of this income made by the children. First, we establish dynamical properties which place the OLG model with family altruism halfway between the model with pure life-cyclers (Diamond (1965) ) and the one with dynastic altruism (Barro (1974) ). Then, we show that this concept leads to interesting fiscal policy conclusions less clear-cut and more realistic than those obtained with the two previous standard OLG models: a pay as you go social security is neutral but not a public debt.
Introduction
The OLG model is a standard tool for modelling dynamic economic behavior over discrete infinite time. Models of this profuse literature can be divided in two streams depending on whether households are life-cyclers or altruists, leaving positive bequests. For the macroeconomic analysis of fiscal policy, these two dominant models leads to opposite conclusions.
In OLG models with capital accumulation and life-cyclers, such as the one initially developed by Diamond (1965) , the balanced growth path may be dynamically inefficient. Then there is a case for fiscal policy such as public debt or pay-as-you-go social security.
In dynastic OLG models with altruistic preferences (see Barro (1974) ), the balanced growth path is efficient and there is no case for fiscal policy. Indeed, altruists exactly offset the positive or negative shocks on their income and on those of their dynasty. Barro's model turns out to be a model with infinitely-lived decision units, namely, the dynasties, whose members are linked through operative parental altruism. Then, the dynasty is the effective decision maker, since it is as long-lived as the government. Any individual belonging to any particular dynasty can observe the government's budget constraint and undo any redistribution, be it financed by current taxes (pay-as-you-go policies) or by future taxes (public debt policies).
Everything works as if on the one hand any model, which considers finite horizon as a reasonable feature of decision-making, should not consider altruistic transfers and, on the other hand, any model with altruistic transfers would end up with an infinite time horizon and yield neutrality of any public transfer policy.
In this paper, in order to solve this dilemma, we implement the concept of family altruism which is aimed at bridging the gap between Barro (1974) and Diamond (1965) models.
In most of the literature, 1 models of dynastic altruism consider that altruism links all the descendants of an individual into a single infinitely-lived entity. Models of pure life-cyclers feature another extreme view on private intergenerational linkages, according to which parents and children are fully distinct economic units. In figure   1 , we represent these links in the two polar canonical cases:
1 See the survey of Michel, Thibault and Vidal (2005) . For all date t, each generation G t live two periods and, eventually, the straight arrows represent intergenerational private transfers and dashed boxes symbolize the relevant decision unit.
Recently, Mankiw (2000) gives facts which persuade economists that neither the Diamond model nor the Barro model is adequate for analyzing fiscal policy.
These models are inconsistent with the empirical findings that consumption tracks current income and with the numerous households near zero wealth. In addition, the Diamond model is inconsistent with the great importance of bequests in aggregate wealth accumulation (see also Arrondel, Masson and Pestieau (1997) ). Moreover in the Barro model there exists a complete harmony among all generations. As
Becker and Tomes (1986) put it, this is at odd with the observation of strategic behavior between parents and children. Following Becker (1991) , one can imagine a less drastic approach to modelling economic relations between parents and children.
The model of family altruism considers that a family is neither a dynasty nor an isolated household. Each individual starts a new family when he becomes adult.
In turn, the individual's children start a new family, when adult themselves, and so on. In this setting, a family unit has a two-period lifetime. Each period there appear as many families as the number of young individuals and there disappear as many families as the number of dying old individuals. Individuals are members of two family units: the family founded by their parents and their own household.
They play a different role in these two families. They belong the the former during their childhood and their adulthood and to the latter when adult and old. In the former, they make no decision, being completely passive when young and being only a descendant when adult. But in the latter they are full-fledged decision makers.
Family altruism are the sentiments between the two successive households. This is implemented by assuming that any individual values three objects: his first-period consumption, his second-period consumption and his offspring's adult disposable income. A standard approach of taking into account children is the joy of giving formulation in which only the gift matters (see Abel and Warshawsky (1988) or Andreoni (1989) ). In this formulation the amount and structure of bequests are not related to children's relative affluence but rather to parental views on what is good for their children, or to the pleasure they derive from giving. So, our specification of preferences seems more adequate to implement family altruism and leads to interesting new properties. The altruist determines the starting position of his grown-up children: indeed, by making a transfer to his offspring, he helps them to get off to a good start. As a corollary, this specification 2 also captures the idea that parents care about their children's income and not about the use of this income by their children. In particular, parents let their children use the bequest as they like in their respective families and they let them cope with taxes and transfers resulting from policies conducted after they die. Figure 2 represents the family structure of the family altruism concept. In such a setting, the altruist's action irons out the inequalities between the children's opportunities. Grand children are likely to benefit from this action but inequalities between them will be smoothed by their own parents. another. In the family altruism model, they are hitched to one another.
The aims of this paper are to analyze the dynamical properties and to focus
2 Some growth models with human capital use a similar concept of altruism. For example, the preference of an altruist in Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) depends on the quality of schools of his children. This variable is directly linked to the adult disposable income of his children. This problem with family altruism has been studied in Lambrecht, Michel and Vidal (2005) .
on fiscal policy conclusions of the OLG model with family altruism. Such a study allows us to differentiate our model from the two dominant OLG models developed by Diamond (1965) and Barro (1965) or from a mix of these standard models Pestieau (1998, 1999) or Mankiw (2000) ).
We first characterize the intertemporal equilibrium of our model using the key concept of "desired wealth", i.e. the wealth parents want for their children, which can be different from their effective wealth if altruism is not operative. We show how this feature, which is specific to family altruism, is articulated to savings and capital accumulation.
We also study in detail the dynamics of capital accumulation of the model with family altruism. Surprisingly enough, its monotonicity rests on fewer assumptions when altruism is operative than when it is not. The limits of the dynamics are also studied. Contrary to the Diamond model, an infinite limit of the capital intensity is possible. In the same way, a poverty trap in the economy without altruism can vanish with altruistic individuals. To summarize our findings, the model with family altruism yields some new and surprising conclusions about fiscal policy and capital accumulation which places it halfway between the model with pure life-cyclers (Diamond (1965) ) and the one with dynastic altruists (Barro (1974) ).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we set up the model. In section 3 we establish results about the existence of an intertemporal equilibrium. The dynamics of capital are studied in Section 4. In section 5 we focus on the existence and the properties of steady states. In section 6 we show that the concept of family altruism leads to interesting fiscal policy conclusions. Section 7
concludes.
The model with family altruism
We consider an OLG model in which agents live two periods. In period t, N t agents are young and supply one unit of labor. N t grows at rate n. The income ω t of each of the N t young agents includes a bequests x t in addition to his wage income w t . He consumes c t and saves s t :
In period t + 1, when he is old, his income is the return on his savings: R t+1 s t , where R t+1 is the gross rate of return. He allocates this income to consume d t+1 and to
give a non-negative bequest x t+1 to his 1 + n children.
His preferences depend on three quantities: consumption when young, c t , consumption when old, d t+1 , and the income of his children (including bequest), ω t+1 :
future: "It would be difficult to convince a man posseded of 20,000 pounds, or any other sum, that a perpetual payment of 50 pounds per annum was equally burdensome with a single tax of 1000 pounds. He would have some vague notion that the 50 pounds per annum would be paid by posterity, and would not be paid by him; but if he leaves his fortune to his son, and leaves it charged with this perpetual tax, where is the difference whether he leaves him 20,000 pounds with the tax, or 19,000 pounds without it ? This argument of charging posterity with the interest of our debt, or of relieving them from a portion of such interest, is often used by otherwise well informed people, but we confess we see no weight in it."
We assume that these preferences are represented by a utility function which is additively separable:
Expliciting the parameter γ > 0 allows to discuss, for a given function u 3 , the effects of a change in the degree of altruism and to obtain the standard Diamond (1965) model for γ=0. The three functions u i , i = 1, 2, 3, are twice continuously differentiable on the set IR + of real positive number and verify for all positive e:
We also assume lim e→0 u i (e) = +∞ and lim e→+∞ u i (e) = 0.
The standard arbitrage condition over the life cycle is:
The optimal choice of x t+1 under the constraint x t+1 ≥ 0 can be equivalently formulated in terms of the children wealth ω t+1 w t+1 + x t+1 and leads to
whereω t+1 is the unique positive solution of
Equation (7) is the arbitrage condition between the second period consumption of the old and the desired wealth of the children when ignoring the restriction x t+1 ≥ 0.
To study the dynamical properties of the OLG model with family altruism, the concept of "desired wealth"ω t+1 is very useful for dynamic analysis.
In period 0, there are N −1 agents who are old. Each of these agents holds a fraction s −1 = K 0 /N −1 of the initial capital stock K 0 and receives the return R 0 s −1 .
He allocates this income to consume d 0 and leave a bequest x 0 to each of his 1 + n children. He maximizes
and ω 0 = w 0 + x 0 . The preceding analysis also applies to these choices. Thus the behavior of the first N −1 old is characterized by the conditions (6) and (7) for
The production side of the economy is standard. There is a representative firm which maximizes profits. The production functionF (K, L) is homogeneous of degree one with respect to capital K and labor L. With a constant depreciation rate δ of capital, the sum of the production and the capital stock after depreciation
The function f is continuous on IR + and twice continuously differentiable on IR + . We assume that for
For given prices, wage w t and gross return R t , the maximum of profits: 
From these relations we can define an intertemporal equilibrium the model with family altruism.
The intertemporal equilibrium
Given the initial capital stock K 0 , an intertemporal equilibrium with perfect foresight is a sequence of prices
, and aggregate variables {L t , K t , Y t , k t } +∞ t=0 such that all agents behave optimally and all markets clear.
The stock K 0 is given and equal to N −1 s −1 by definition of s −1 . At each period t ≥ 1, the capital stock results from the savings of the preceding period K t = N t−1 s t−1 . The labor supply is N t and the labor market equilibrium implies L t = N t .
The capital intensity is k t = K t /N t , and the prices verify (8) . Total production is Y t = N t f (k t ) and the good market equilibrium results from the individual budget constraints and the firm's allocation of incomes:
We shall show that at equilibrium all individual variables can be written as functions of the capital intensity. Let us first show this property forω t+1 , the solution of equation (7). According to (8) , since s t = (1 + n)k t+1 we have:
Hence,ω t+1 which is the solution of (1+n)
is a function of k t+1 and can be equivalently defined by:
From the assumption on u, u i are one-to-one decreasing functions from IR + onto IR + . This implies that ψ(ω) andω + ψ(ω) are one to one increasing functions from IR + onto IR + ; and they are continuously differentiable. Thus equation (9) defines
The functionω is increasing and differentiable on IR + , and it verifies:
At each period t, knowingω t =ω(k t ), we obtain from (6):
We can now calculate
, and
The dynamics of the capital intensity, (1 + n)k t+1 = s t , is given at equilibrium by the savings decisions which result from condition (5) . By substitution, we obtain:
or equivalently:
Since the right hand side of (13) is decreasing with respect to ω t+1 = max{w(k t+1 ), ω(k t+1 )}, it can also be written as follows:
where functions g 0 and g 1 are:
We have shown that:
Proposition 1 The intertemporal equilibrium
Given k 0 = K 0 /N 0 , an intertemporal equilibrium with perfect foresight is uniquely determined by a sequence of capital intensity {k t } +∞ t=0 which verifies for all t ≥ 0 the dynamic equation (14) .
The functional form g 0 with zero bequest at date t + 1 corresponds to the dynamics in the Diamond (1965) model without altruism (i.e. γ = 0). In reference to the Diamond model, the variables of the model without altruism are noted by the upper-script D. Thus, the equilibrium dynamics in the Diamond model is:
4 Dynamics of the capital intensity . Let us first study the limits of the left hand side of equation (17) . The limit when k goes to +∞ of (1 + n)k + g 0 (k) is +∞, since g 0 (k) is positive. For the limit when k goes to 0, since the limit of
) is +∞, and the limit of g 0 (k) is zero. Thus we have:
These limit properties imply that for any positive k D t , there exists at least one value of k D t+1 solution of (17) . In order to obtain a unique value of k D t+1 solution of (17) , one needs an additional assumption. The following condition is a sufficient condition for the dynamics in the Diamond model are well defined.
Assumption 1 Determinacy of the dynamics in the Diamond model
The function (1 + n)k + g 0 (k) is strictly increasing.
The relevance of this assumption has been underlined by de la Croix and Michel (2002). They exhibit conditions under which Assumption 1 is satisfied. For example, it is the case when the elasticity of u 2 is greater or equal to one. 5 No assumption on f at k = 0 is necessary. We have with the mean value theorem for derivatives (with 0 < θ < 1): f (k) − f (0) = kf (θk) > kf (k) > 0 and taking the limit when k goes to 0, we obtain lim k→0 kf (k) = 0. The limit of f (k) is either finite and positive or +∞. In both cases,
We now study the dynamics of the capital intensity in the model with family altruism. Since the dynamics in the Diamond model are well defined, we can compare the two dynamics.
Proposition 2 Dynamics of capital intensity
(ii) The dynamics of the capital intensity are monotonic.
(iii) For all t, the dynamics verify k t ≥ k Proof: (i) The existence for all k t of at least one solution k t+1 of equation (14) results simply from the limit value of the right hand side. Indeed we have 0 ≤ lim k→0 min{g 0 (k), g 1 (k)} ≤ lim k→0 g 0 (k) = 0 and lim k→+∞ (1+n)k+min{g 0 (k), g 1 (k)} = +∞ since g 0 (k) and g 1 (k) are non negative.
The function g 1 (k) is strictly increasing; indeed its derivative g 1 is equal to
With Assumption 1, (1 + n)k + min{g 0 (k), g 1 (k)} is a strictly increasing function of k. This implies the uniqueness of k t+1 solution of (14) for given k t .
(ii) Since ω(k t ) is also an increasing function of k t , the dynamics are monotonic.
(iii) Let us show k t ≥ k D t by induction. This is true at t = 0 since k
Assume that it is verified at t: k t ≥ k D t . Then, according to (14) we have:
The intuition that the capital stock is larger in the economy with family altruism than in the model without altruism is simple. Any agent willing to leave a bequest has to save more; this of course increases the capital stock.
Since the equilibrium dynamics are monotonic, they converge either to +∞, or to zero, or to a finite positive limit which is a steady state. We now focus on the two first cases while the study of steady states will be treated in section 5.
In the Diamond model, an infinite limit of the capital intensity is excluded (see, for example, Jones et Manuelli (1992) ). In addition it may exist a poverty trap, i.e., an equilibrium dynamics which converge to zero (see Galor and Ryder (1989) ).
The introduction of the assumption of altruism allows to increase the capital intensity. Therefore, unlike the model without altruism, the model with family altruism can converge to +∞. In the same way, a poverty trap in the economy without altruism can vanish with altruistic individuals (for illustrating examples see Lambrecht, Michel and Thibault (2000) ).
We can notice that our dynamic study has been conducted without restriction on whether the economy is in a regime with positive or zero bequest. In the next section, we refine this "general" study by exploring the long run regime of the economy.
The long run regime
In general, there are several steady states in the Diamond economy (see Galor and Ryder (1989) ). Each of these states is potentially a steady state in an economy with altruism, when altruism is weak enough for the equilibrium bequest to be zero (see Thibault (2000) for dynastic altruism). We consider this point in the case of family altruism.
Steady states of the Diamond model are solutions of: 
is equal to zero. Thus the inequalityω(k But such an inefficient steady state is excluded if the the Golden Rule capital stock k, i.e., such that f (k) = 1 + n, satisfies the following condition:
whereω is the solution of:
Indeed we prove in Appendix B the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Steady states with positive bequests
A multiplicity of steady states with positive bequests can exist but no more than one with over-accumulation of capital. A sufficient condition for excluding overaccumulation of capital is that the golden rule capital stockk satisfies (21).
The property of no more than one steady state with positive bequest and overaccumulation needs no assumption. The condition which excludes inefficiency holds if the degree of altruism is not too large. Indeed, the solutionω(γ) of (1 + n)
is an increasing function of γ. It increases from 0 to f (k) when γ increases from 0 to +∞. But the condition (21) is equivalent toω <ω, whereω equalizes to zero the decreasing function of ω,
, which decreases from +∞ to −∞ when ω increases from
(1 + n)k to f (k). Then the condition (21), equivalent toω(γ) <ω, determines an upper-boundγ on γ. In the model with family altruism, when bequests are positive, the wealthω(k) is simply linked to the production (equation (9)) and not to the wage. Irregularities then result from the utility functions and in the example of Appendix we show that there exists a concave utility function u 3 leading to as many steady states with positive bequests as we want. 7 
Fiscal policies
We now study fiscal policies under the assumption of operative altruism. In the general case, the government budget constraint combines public spending (G t ) and previous debt reimbursement 8 at time t (R t B t−1 ), on the one hand, taxes collected on the young (N t τ 1 t ) and on the old N t−1 τ 2 t (positive or negative) and new debt issue on the other (B t ):
Since individual preferences do not depend on public expenditures and since we focus on purely redistributive fiscal policies, we set G t = 0. The total amount of taxes T t is equal to the sum of the taxes bearing on young and old at time t:
Thus the government budget constraint writes :
A pay-as-you-go pension system is a special case of this government budget constraint with, for all t, B t = 0 and N t τ
t , then time t new bonds issue per head of young individuals are given by :
Let us sketch quickly the amendments to the model without public debt. The introduction of governmental taxes modifies the individuals' constraints as follows:
With a CES utility function, the steady state is unique (see Lambrecht, Michel and Thibault (2000)).
8 Bonds are assumed to have a single period maturity.
The individuals' first-order conditions remain unchanged. The representative firm's behavior is unaffected.
Governmental bonds compete with private physical capital. If bonds are to be exchanged in equilibrium, they must bear the same return than physical capital. In equilibrium we now have :
In the model without public debt,
and is an increasing function of capital intensity k t+1 . In the model with public debt, it solves (
and s t = (1 + n) k t+1 +b t , as well as the government budget constraint (22) , this expression of d t+1 can be rewritten as follows :
Consequently equation (9) becomes: f (k t+1 ) + b t+1 − ω t+1 = ψ (ω t+1 ) and the young disposable income can be written as a functionω of k t+1 and b t+1 from:
The functionω has the following properties:
With respect to the model without policy, public debt modifies the allocation between the old's consumption ψ (ω t+1 ) and the young's income ω t+1 because the size of the "cake" to be divided in each period is now f (k t+1 ) + b t+1
We now turn the the dynamics of capital intensity. The equation (13) describing the motion of capital intensity becomes
with:
It is interesting to note that in the equilibrium dynamics (equation (24)), the level of public debts matters but not the taxes or the transfers. In the economy with family altruism, the two policies of public debt and intergenerational transfers are not equivalent, although they are equivalent in the Diamond economy (Buiter and Kletzer (1998)) and in the Barro economy (since both are neutral).
The property of non-equivalence can be explained by considering the family income of one period which is equal to the sum of the income of the old agent and the income of his 1 + n children, i.e. in period t + 1:
This income finances the consumption of the old d t+1 and the income of the young (1 + n)ω t+1 . This income is modified by a change in debt policy, because
Then, the optimal arbitrage in period t + 1 between d t+1 and ω t+1 , i.e. the solution of maximizing u 2 (d t+1 ) + γu 3 (ω t+1 ) subject
It is also interesting to note that the same arbitrage applies when there is a second period additional income of the old. For example, if there is a supply of θ units of labor in the second period of life, the family income in period t + 1 is:
The second period of life income of the young will occur in period t + 2 and does not enter in the family income of period t + 1. It will enter the young's own family income of period t + 2 together with taxes and transfers of period t + 2.
Note finally that if we want explicitly to introduce an additional income in the last period of life, this additional income must be correlated with the capital accumulation. In other words, we cannot work in an exchange economy framework. As OLG model in which agents work during their second period of life. They assume that there is an age-specific labor productivity which is related to the age-earnings profile studied in labor economics. The authors exhibit sufficient conditions ruling out dynamic inefficiency (or, equivalently the non-neutrality of public debt) if age-specific labor productivity is sufficiently strong.
Proposition 5 Determination of the intertemporal equilibrium
Given initial conditions k 0 and b −1 = 0, the intertemporal equilibrium {k t+1 } +∞ t=0
with unconstrained bequests is determined by the sequence of public debt levels (per young, {b t } +∞ t=1 ), or, equivalently, by the sequence of total taxes (per young, {t t } +∞ t=0 ). As long as bequests are unconstrained, the intertemporal equilibrium does not depend on the allocation of taxes between the young and the old.
Proof: Equation (24) only involves capital intensities and debt levels. The equivalence between tax levels t t and debt levels b t in determining the equilibrium comes from the budget constraint b t = (1 + n) −1 R t b t−1 − t t . At each period t, given the debt level b t−1 , choosing t t implies the debt level b t . Alternatively, choosing a debt level b t implies a tax level t t . QED From this proposition it is straightforward to deduce the following result:
Proposition 6 Neutrality of a pay-as-you-go pension system A special case of the preceding proposition is obtained with no debt, i.e. with pay-as-you-go pension system. In that case, proposition 5 means that there is no effect on the equilibrium
Proof: Pay-as-you-go policies are equivalent to b t = 0. Thus the dynamics are unchanged with respect to the absence of fiscal policy. QED
The interpretation of this result is that transfers inside the family completely offset public transfers. Any increase in the taxes levied on the young is compensated by an increase in the old's bequest. Indeed, as you can see in Figure 3 , public intergenerational transfers (the broken arrows) generated by the pay-as-you-go pension system are neutralized inside the family unit by private intergenerational transfers (the straight arrows). This feature is thus common to the family altruism model and the dynastic altruism model. Indeed, Figure 4 explains intuitively why a pay-as-you-go pension system is neutral in the Barro's framework but not in the Diamond's one.
? Figure 4 : PAYG Social Security -Diamond (left side) vs Barro (right side)
Let us focus now on the effects of public debt in our model with family altruism:
The effects of public debt
An increase public debt b t+1 in period t + 1 increases consumption of the generation born in t, c t and d t+1 and reduces the capital stock in all the following periods.
Proof: We first compute dk t+1 /db t+1 . We have:
Hence, dk t+1 /db t+1 = −G b /G k < 0. The dynamics are monotonic : thus the capital stock is reduced in all the following periods. Then we compute ∂c t /∂b t+1 , the effect on consumption at time t, with c t =ω (k t , b t ) − (1 + n) k t+1 and ∂d t+1 /∂b t+1 , the effect on consumption at time t+1, with
Then:
we have:
Then: f u 2 ∂d t+1 ∂b t+1 = ∂k t+1 ∂b t+1 (−(1 + n)u 1 − f u 2 ) < 0, and ∂d t+1 /∂b t+1 > 0. QED This is in line with the conventional view of public debt. This view distinguishes between short run effects and long run effects. In the short run, each household spends more on consumption goods. This leads to an increase in aggregate demand for output and to an increase in national income. However capital accumulation is reduced by substitution of government bonds to firm assets. Precisely, our proposition shows that the increase in debts at some date increases the consumption of the old generation at the current period and decreases the capital stock available for production.
Intuitively, public debt is not neutral in our setting because, according to Figure   5 , public intergenerational transfers (the broken arrows) generated by the public debt can not be neutralized inside the family unit by private intergenerational transfers (the straight arrows). The non-neutrality result of public debt in the family altruism model is a common feature with the Diamond model. Indeed, Figure 6 explains intuitively why a public debt policy is neutral in the Diamond's framework but not in the Barro's one. Then, family altruism is the first concept of altruism which leads to fiscal policy conclusions that are less clear-cut than those obtained in the canonical macrodynamic models with pure life-cyclers (Diamond (1965) ) and the ones of the dynastic altruism (Barro (1974) ) and the ones with warm glow altruism (Andreoni (1989) ).Indeed, this concept allows to differentiate the effect of a public debt policy and of a pay as you go social security.
Conclusion
We studied an amended formulation of the altruistic transfer motive in the framework of an OLG model. The idea of the family altruism used in this paper is that altruistic parents care only about their children income and not about the use of this income made by the children. Models with human capital (see e.g. Glomm and Ravikumar (1992)) have used this particular specification of altruism of the adult disposable income. In this paper, we translate it to a model with physical capital. 
This inequality implies thatω(k
Thus the equilibrium dynamics {k t } +∞ t=0 starting at k 0 = k D max is increasing. Either it goes to +∞ or it converges to a steady state. When it converges to a finite limit, bequests at the steady state are necessarily positive because it is not a steady state of the economy without bequest. When it converges to +∞, we may say that +∞ is a "steady state" of the economy with family altruism, and, for large t, bequests are necessarily positive (zero bequests imply a decrease in k for large t). (ii) According to (13) , a steady state verifies if it exists:
This condition defines a curve C 1 : ω = ω 1 (k) such that:
and if f (k) ≤ 1 + n, then ω 1 (k) > f (k). But a steady state with positive bequests also verifies ω =ω(k), i.e. (k, ω) belongs to the curve C 2 defined by f (k) =ω +ψ(ω); and we have (relation (11))ω (k) < f (k). Since the two curves C 1 and C 2 verifỹ ω (k) < ω 1 (k) for all k ≥k, they cannot intersect more than once.
(iii) Moreover, the two curves C 1 and C 2 do not intersect (in over-accumulation of capital) whenω(k) < ω 1 (k). The value ofω =ω(k) is determined by (1+n)u 2 [(1+ n)(f (k) −ω)] = γu 3 (ω) and ω 1 (k) >ω is equivalent to (21) .
Appendix C: Steady states with positive bequests
Assume that U (c, d, ω) = ln c t + β ln d t+1 + γu 3 (ω) and f (k t ) = k α t with α ≤ 1/2 such that 1 + β < α(1 − α)/(1 − 2α). For all positive p, we will show that it exists a concave function u 3 such that the model with family altruism experiences at least p equilibria with positive bequests.
Step 1: Characterization of equilibria with positive bequests.
With our utility specification the function ψ and g 1 of equation (9) and (16) Therefore, the ω which are equilibria with positive bequests must satisfy :
Hence, any ω which satisfies the two following conditions is an equilibrium with positive bequests:
Step 2: Construction and variation of pairs (ω,σ).
For all positive µ, we can defineω andσ such that: is negative. Thus it exists κ > 0 such that ∀ µ ∈]1 − κ, 1 + κ[ f (µ) < 0.
Step 3: Existence of u 3 to obtain p equilibria with positive bequests.
Let p be a positive integer. According to step 2 we can construct an increasing sequence of real numbers µ 1 , µ 2 ,..., µ p such that:
∀ i ∈ 1, ..., p 1 < µ i < 1 + κ and f (µ i ) < 0
For each µ i we construct the pair (ω i ,σ i ) studied in step 2.
Sinceω 1 ,ω 2 ,...,ω p are distinct, it exists a differentiable decreasing function
The function u 3 can be decreasing because ∂ω i /∂µ i > 0 and f (µ i ) < 0 implies ∂σ i /∂µ i < 0. Since u 3 (ω) is integrable (because continuous) we can construct a differentiable function u 3 (ω) such that its derivative is the function u 3 (ω). And, since u 3 is a decreasing function, u 3 is a concave function.
By construction, for all i we haveω i u 3 (ω i ) = [µ i (1 − α)β]/(αγ).
Then, since µ i > 1,ω i satisfies (26).
Moreover, substitutingω i u 3 (ω i ) by [µ i (1 − α)β]/(αγ) in (25), we can easily check thatω i also satisfies (25).
Therefore, we have constructed a concave function u 3 such that the pω i 's verify (25) and (26). Hence, according to step 1, our model has at least p equilibria with positive bequests.
